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CITRUS GROVES IN THE CLOUD: IS CRYPTOCURRENCY 
CLOUD MINING A SECURITY? 
Darren J. Sandler† 
Cloud mining of blockchain cryptocurrency is a growing 
industry that has largely flown under the radar of regulators, who thus 
far tend to focus on initial coin offerings. Cloud mining is an economic 
arrangement whereby a person pays another person or entity to engage 
in cryptocurrency mining on their behalf and receives the transaction 
fees, cryptocurrency or a portion thereof that is generated from such 
mining efforts. This arrangement raises securities law concerns, as 
such arrangements can be viewed as “investment contracts” under 
federal securities laws. The implications are significant; cloud mining 
contracts deemed to be securities must be registered with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission or otherwise eligible for an exemption from 
registration (such as a private placement). Issuers and other 
participants involved in the sale of unregistered securities in violation 
of the Securities Act of 1933 may be subject to liabilities and other 
investor remedies under state and federal securities laws, including 
private rights of action and rescission. Moreover, the anti-fraud 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can impose liability 
with respect to any purchase or sale of a security—registered or not. 
  
                                                             
† Darren J. Sandler is a corporate attorney in the New York office of Kirkland & Ellis LLP. His 
practice focuses on the formation, organization, operation and securities regulatory compliance 
of domestic and offshore hedge funds, private equity funds, funds-of-funds, real estate funds and 
other investment vehicles. In addition, Darren represents investment advisers in connection with 
registration under, and compliance with, the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended. 
Darren also advises clients on the regulatory compliance considerations related to blockchain 
cryptocurrency and other digital tokens and has represented blockchain cryptocurrency token 
issuers in connection with their virtual currency and blockchain protocol launches and related 
strategic matters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cloud mining of blockchain cryptocurrency is a growing industry 
that has largely flown under the radar of regulators, who thus far tend 
to focus on initial coin offerings (“ICOs”). From an enforcement 
standpoint, federal agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) have not taken much action in 
connection with blockchain cryptocurrency mining, a key aspect of 
blockchain and cryptocurrency technology. Four developments stand 
out, but more activity would provide greater clarity to legal 
practitioners, entrepreneurs, investors, and blockchain protocol users. 
In January 2014, FinCEN carved out certain situations of 
cryptocurrency mining from its definition of a money services business 
(“MSB”).1 In March 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issued 
a notice to clarify the tax treatment of cryptocurrencies, including those 
generated through mining.2 In September 2014, the FTC brought a civil 
action against a cryptocurrency mining hardware and cloud mining 
company.3 In June 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Connecticut entered a final default judgment in a case brought by the 
SEC against two related cryptocurrency cloud mining companies.4  
Cloud mining is an economic arrangement in which a person pays 
another person or entity to engage in cryptocurrency mining on their 
behalf and receives the transaction fees, cryptocurrency or a portion 
thereof that is generated from such mining efforts.5 This arrangement, 
which occurs in a variety of forms, raises securities law concerns, as 
such arrangements can potentially be viewed as “investment contracts” 
under federal securities laws.  
Under the federal securities laws, an investment contract is: (1) an 
investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with an 
expectation of profits; (4) derived solely from the efforts of others.6 
The various circuit courts have diverged with respect to how to apply 
                                                             
 1. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dept. of the Treasury, Guidance Letter on 
Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Mining Operations, FIN-2014-R001 
(Jan. 30, 2014), http://bit.do/FinCEN_Guidanceletter_FIN2014R001. See infra Part II.A. 
 2. I.R.S. Virtual Currency Guidance, Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938. 
 3. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. BF Labs, Inc., No. 4:14–CV–00815–BCW, 2014 WL 7238080 
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014). 
 4. Homero Joshua Garza, GAW Miners, LLC, & ZenMiner, LLC, Litigation Release No. 
23852, 2017 WL 2437886 (June 5, 2017) [hereinafter Litigation Release No. 23852]. 
 5. Hari Krishnan et al., Cryptocurrency Mining – Transition to Cloud, 6 INT’L J. OF 
ADVANCED COMPUTER SCI. & APPLICATIONS 115 (2015). 
 6. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1947). 
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the second prong of this analysis. The Supreme Court case that first 
articulated this test, SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. (hereinafter “Howey”),7 
provides a direct lens through which to analyze whether certain cloud 
mining arrangements are investment contracts. In certain instances, 
cloud mining is a redux of the citrus groves discussed in Howey.  
In Section I, this Article provides a background explanation of 
cryptocurrency mining and cloud mining, which is necessary for 
attorneys, scholars, and regulators to engage in this topic and for cloud 
mining companies to comply with federal securities laws. Section II 
surveys several U.S. regulatory agency responses to cryptocurrency 
mining. Section III discusses Howey, briefly surveys the circuit split 
with respect to its interpretation and analyzes cloud mining under 
Howey8 and the various circuit court approaches thereunder. Section III 
also discusses a 2017 SEC enforcement action involving cloud 
mining.9 The implications are significant; cloud mining contracts 
deemed to be securities must be registered with the SEC or otherwise 
eligible for an exemption from registration (such as a private 
placement). Issuers and other participants involved in the sale of 
unregistered securities in violation of the Securities Act of 1933 
(“Securities Act”) may be subject to liabilities and other investor 
remedies under state and federal securities laws, including private 
rights of action and rescission. In addition, the anti-fraud provisions of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) can impose 
liability with respect to any purchase or sale of such securities 
irrespective of whether such cloud mining securities are registered or 
offered through a private placement.10 This Article then concludes by 
offering best practices for structuring cryptocurrency cloud mining 
arrangements in a manner unlikely to be considered securities or 
conversely in a manner that complies with federal securities laws. 
I. BACKGROUND 
An understanding of blockchain cryptocurrency mining is 
necessary for attorneys, regulators, and scholars to engage in the 
rapidly growing cryptocurrency industry and advise cloud mining 
companies in connection with regulatory compliance considerations 
under federal and state securities laws. Blockchain is a form of 
                                                             
 7. Id. at 298-99.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Homero Joshua Garza, No. 3:15-cv-01760 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 
2015). The final order was released in Litigation Release No. 23852, supra note 4. Garza later 
pled guilty to criminal charges in United States v. Homero Joshua Garza, No. 17-cr-00158 (D. 
Conn. July 20, 2017). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). 
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distributed and replicated ledger or database that is cryptographically 
secured.11 Blockchain protocols are specific sets of rules drafted in 
computer programming code.12 The “blocks” in the blockchain are 
collections of transactions.13 The type of blockchain ledger discussed 
herein is distributed among computers across the world, has no central 
intermediary or point of failure, and is replicated on each computer that 
runs the software relating to the blockchain.14 There are variations of 
these themes among different blockchain protocols and their related 
cryptocurrency tokens.15 The data that the blockchain records and 
stores are represented by cryptographic hashes, rather than the actual 
information underlying it.16 Usually, maintenance of blockchains are 
decentralized and/or distributed. When used to support a decentralized 
payment system, for example, there is a need for volunteers to step in 
to serve the functions normally handled by central intermediaries and 
institutions such as banks or money services businesses.17  
The distributed volunteers are known as “miners,” who build and 
manage the blockchain and receive new cryptocurrency and/or 
transaction fees as a reward for their efforts.18 For a typical blockchain 
protocol like that of Bitcoin, mining is a crucial “back office,” technical 
                                                             
 11. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG, 
at 5 (Oct. 31, 2008), http://bit.do/Nakamoto_Bitcoin. Blockchain technology is a marriage of 
distributed systems computer science and cryptography. See ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., 
BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016); 
see also The Great Chain of Being Sure about Things, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), 
http://bit.do/Economist_Great-chain.  
 12. See Nakamoto, supra note 11. 
 13. See Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 2. 
 14. Joshua Nussbaum, Mapping the Blockchain Project Ecosystem, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 
16, 2017), http://bit.do/Nussbaum_Mapping-the-Blockchain. See THE ETHEREUM NODES 
EXPLORER, NETWORK 1, http://bit.do/Ethereum-Nodes (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (showing the 
global distribution of Ethereum nodes); BITNODES, http://bit.do/Bitnodes (last visited Apr. 5, 
2018) (showing the global distribution of Bitcoin nodes). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Essentially, blockchains appear as unintelligible strings of numbers and letters and not 
a true record book or medieval-style accounting ledger that is sometimes used to describe a 
blockchain. See Ameer Rosic, What Is Hashing? Under the Hood of Blockchain, BLOCKGEEKS 
(Aug. 2017), http://bit.do/Rosic_Hashing. 
 17. Some blockchains are centralized and/or private. These are known as permissioned 
blockchains, whereas the blockchains discussed herein are generally “permissionless.” Because 
permissioned blockchains are centralized, they generally do not rely on mining or transaction fees 
to the same extent, if at all, that permissionless blockchains do. See Rob Marvin, Blockchain: The 
Invisible Technology That's Changing the World, PCMAG (Aug. 29, 2017, 1:38 PM), 
http://bit.do/Marvin_Blockchain; Andreas Antonopoulos, Bitcoin Security Model: Trust By 
Computation, RADAR (Feb. 20, 2014), http://bit.do/Antonopoulos_Bitcoin-security-model; 
Hyperledger Architecture, Vol. 1, HYPERLEDGER (Aug. 2017), http://bit.do/Hyperledger. 
 18. Nakamoto, supra note 11. See also Joseph Bonneau et al., SoK: Research Perspectives 
and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies, 2015 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 
PROC. 104, 104-21. 
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function served by persons or collections of persons (known as pools) 
to validate transactions and reach a distributed consensus with respect 
to such transactions that are then grouped into blocks of transactions 
and added to the blockchain-ledger.19 Although ultimately managed by 
people, at a high level, the act of mining and transaction validation is 
just passively running software.20 These computers are known as 
“nodes”; each is a connection point that can receive, create, store or 
send data along distributed network routes.21 The human element lies 
primarily in setting up the computer hardware and software and 
ensuring that the machines are connected to the network and kept at an 
optimal temperature. Miners are essential for decentralized blockchain 
protocols; unlike traditional payment and transfer systems, 
decentralized blockchain protocols have no central intermediary to 
process and validate transactions and manage the ledger.22  
An incentive is required to attract miners onto a blockchain 
protocol to serve such functions. The incentive is a reward of additional 
cryptocurrency and/or transaction fees, which are paid to the first miner 
to create the block (other miners verify the validity the block but do not 
receive any reward or transaction fees).23 The generation of new 
cryptocurrency units as a reward also increases the supply of the 
relevant cryptocurrency, and the rate of increase usually decreases over 
time as mining increases (discussed more below). For certain methods 
of processing and validating blockchain transactions, the term 
“mining” or “miner” does not accurately describe the process because 
no new cryptocurrencies are generated or “mined”; the only reward in 
those cases are transaction fees. However, the term “mining” and 
“miner” tends to be used in less technical circles to describe (loosely) 
                                                             
 19. See discussion of hashing power infra Part I.C. Mining pools exist to increase the 
hashing power, which translates to likelihood of creating blocks and mining rewards. See also 
Ittay Eyal, The Miner’s Dilemma, 2015 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY PROC. 89 (2015) 
(discussing technical rationale of pooled mining). 
 20. See Running A Full Node, BITCOINCORE (last visited Mar. 9, 2018), http://bit.do/full-
node; see also ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES (2014) (providing a technical reference guide). 
 21. Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 2. See also Giuseppe DeCandia et al., Dynamo: Amazon's 
Highly Available Key-value Store, 2007 SYMP. ON OPERATING SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES 205, 209-
10. Not all nodes must mine, however all nodes store the blockchain, which furthers its distributed 
immutability and security.  
 22. See Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 4. See also Ethereum Whitepaper: A Next-Generation 
Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, ETHEREUM WIKI (last updated Apr. 13, 
2018), http://bit.do/Ethereum-Whitepaper.  
 23. See Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 4. Transaction fees are market-based, determined by 
the collective influence of the miners. Transaction fees are generally not set by the blockchain 
protocol, but act as an additional incentive to ensure that a miner will decide to mine a specific 
transaction on the network.  
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all blockchain transaction processing functions, regardless of the 
algorithm used and its technicalities.24  
The two predominant methods for reaching consensus and mining 
or processing transactions of blockchain cryptocurrencies are “proof of 
work” and “proof of stake.” Proof of work and proof of stake are 
computational rules that govern how transactions are processed and 
validated. These algorithms require proofs that the miners or 
transaction processors have done something that is “difficult” to do.25 
These difficulties are in place in order to protect the integrity of the 
blockchain and deter bad actors from wrongly manipulating the 
blockchain.26 Usually, transactions in blockchain cryptocurrency can 
only be processed according to one of these methods, but some 
protocols allow for both or a different method entirely.27 Readers are 
encouraged to learn more about the differences, advantages, and 
disadvantages of each alternative mining method.28  
                                                             
 24. See, e.g., Ameer Rosic, Proof of Work vs Proof of Stake: Basic Mining Guide, 
BLOCKGEEKS (Feb. 1, 2017), http://bit.do/Rosic_Proof-of-work (referring to proof of stake as a 
form of mining). Vitalik Buterin, What Proof of Stake Is and Why It Matters, BITCOIN MAG. (Aug. 
26, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://bit.do/Buterin_Proof-of-Stake (using the term mining in connection 
with proof of stake) [hereinafter What Proof of Stake Is]. The technical inaccuracy may have 
resulted from the fact that Ethereum, a well-known blockchain protocol that pioneered proof of 
stake, originally used a proof-of-work mining algorithm for transaction processing. See also 
Alyssa Hertig, Ethereum's Big Switch: The New Roadmap to Proof-of-Stake, COINDESK (last 
updated May 16, 2017, 4:27 PM), http://bit.do/Hertig_Ethereum-big-switch; Vitalik Buterin, 
Proof of Stake FAQ, ETHEREUM WIKI (last updated Mar. 24, 2018), 
http://bit.do/Buterin_Ethereum_Proof-of-stake-FAQ. 
 25. See Nakamoto, supra note 11; see also Buterin, What Proof of Stake Is, BITCOIN MAG., 
supra note 24.   
 26. See Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 1-4 (“Transactions that are computationally 
impractical to reverse would protect sellers from fraud . . . . To modify a past block, an attacker 
would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with 
and surpass the work of the honest nodes …. [T]he probability of a slower attacker catching up 
diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added . . . . If a greedy attacker is able to 
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it 
to defraud people by stealing back his payments or using it to generate new coins.”). See also 
Buterin, Proof of Stake FAQ, supra note 24 (“Proof of stake opens the door to a wider array of 
techniques that use game-theoretic mechanism design in order to better discourage centralized 
cartels from forming and, if they do form, from acting in ways that are harmful to the network 
(e.g., like selfish mining in proof of work). Reduced centralization risks, as economies of scale 
are much less of an issue. $10 million of coins will get you exactly 10 times higher returns than 
$1 million of coins, without any additional disproportionate gains because at the higher level you 
can afford better mass-production equipment. Ability to use economic penalties to make various 
forms of 51% attacks vastly more expensive to carry out than proof of work—to paraphrase Vlad 
Zamfir, ‘it's as though your ASIC farm burned down if you participated in a 51% attack.’”). 
 27. See, e.g., Sunny King & Scott Nadal, PPCoin: Peer-to-Peer Crypto-Currency with 
Proof-of-Stake, PEERCOIN.NET (Aug. 19, 2012), http://bit.do/King_PPCoin.  
 28. There is no authoritative source to learn about this technology. In this regard, the author 
encourages readers to conduct their own investigations and include a variety of media forms, 
including video instruction and tutorial. See JAMESON LOPP, Bitcoin Resources, LOPP.NET 
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A. Proof of Work 
Proof-of-work miners use advanced and relatively expensive 
computer hardware (known as application-specific integrated circuits 
or “ASICs”) to run software that expends effort (consumes energy) to 
solve cryptographic math puzzles to validate cryptocurrency 
transactions and enter those transactions into the distributed ledger.29 
The required proof is that the mathematical computation has been 
successfully performed.30 Proof-of-work blockchain protocols are 
typically designed to make mining harder (i.e., require more energy 
consumption) as more persons mine the cryptocurrency and the reward 
size decreases per mined block over time.31 These blockchain protocols 
are designed this way to give the cryptocurrency a deflationary 
characteristic, ensuring either a hard fixed supply or a theoretical fixed 
supply, depending on the specific protocol, and to protect the network 
from abuse, as discussed in the next paragraph.32 In the case of Bitcoin, 
the protocol has a 50% mining reward reduction every 210,000 blocks, 
or approximately every four years. In the year 2012, one miner could 
receive 50 Bitcoins for mining a single block, but as of the date of this 
Article’s publication, the reward is 12.50 Bitcoins.33 By 2140, the 
                                                             
http://bit.do/Lopp_Bitcoin-resources (last visited on Mar. 24, 2018), for a list of educational 
resources discussing Bitcoin, blockchain, and other cryptocurrency; see also SCANATE, EthList: 
The Crowdsourced Ethereum Reading List, http://bit.do/Scanate_Ethlist (last visited Mar. 24, 
2018), for a list of educational resources discussing Ethereum, blockchain, and other 
cryptocurrency. 
 29. ASICs are application specific, meaning that the hardware is exceptionally effective 
for a very specific narrow purpose (in our case, mining) to the exclusion of others. This is in 
contrast to a traditional consumer desktop computer, which can perform functions that mining 
ASICs cannot, such as web browsing and word processing, but are generally not suitable for 
mining. See Chris Hoffman, Cryptocurrency Miners Explained: Why You Really Don’t Want This 
Junk on Your PC, HOW TO GEEK (Mar. 11, 2015), http://bit.do/Hoffman_Cryptocurrency-Miners. 
 30. See Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 3; see also Section I, supra (“These algorithms require 
proofs that the miners or transaction processors have done something that is ‘difficult’ to do.”). 
 31. See Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 3. 
 32. See Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 4 (“Once a predetermined number of coins have 
entered circulation, the incentive can transition entirely to transaction fees and be completely 
inflation free.”). Nakamoto posited a point at which the reward of new bitcoin generated would 
be so small that transaction fees would become the primary mining incentive. Bitcoin’s supply is 
a theoretical fixed supply—an asymptote that approaches 21 million bitcoins. However, because 
the satoshi—a one hundred millionth of a single bitcoin (0.00000001 BTC)—is currently the 
smallest unit of the bitcoin currency recorded on the blockchain, there may be a point where the 
reward for creating a new block is less than a satoshi and thus the equivalent of zero. This would 
render the supply of bitcoin a hard-fixed supply, unless a lesser unit of division is established and 
recorded on the blockchain. See also Controlled Supply, BITCOIN WIKI, http://bit.do/Bitcoin-
Wiki_Controlled-supply (Mar. 1, 2018) (discussing the technical aspects of bitcoin supply 
generation algorithm); Rosic, supra note 24 (discussing protection of the blockchain). 
 33. See Bitcoin Developer Guide, BITCOIN.ORG (last visited Apr. 14, 2018), 
http://bit.do/Bitcoin_Developer-Guide; Melvin Draupnir, What is the Bitcoin Mining Block 
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theoretical fixed supply of 21 million Bitcoins will have been 
generated.34 This decreasing-supply algorithm was chosen because it 
mimics the rate at which commodities like gold are mined.35  
Seeking to ensure that the blockchain network would not be (i) 
spammed by miners attempting to create empty blocks in order to 
increase their chances of earning the reward or (ii) attacked by miners 
seeking to gain control of the network and defraud the network (i.e., by 
altering the blockchain), a proof-of-work protocol includes a self-
regulating concept known as “difficulty.”36 In simple terms, the 
“difficulty” is the complexity of the cryptographic math problem that 
must be solved to create a block. The protocol is designed to increase 
the difficulty as the number of miners mining the cryptocurrency 
increases.37 The increased difficulty translates into greater energy 
costs, which have increased significantly: the amount of energy 
consumed to mine a single transaction (less than a block) could power 
30 U.S. households for one day or one household for 30 days.38  
B. Proof of Stake 
Proof-of-stake protocols do not require expensive, power-hungry 
machines to create blocks and validate and verify transactions. All that 
is necessary is for the validator to store (stake) an amount of 
cryptocurrency in their digital wallet (software).39 As opposed to proof-
of-work mining, where the required proof is the successful 
mathematical computation, the required proof in a proof-of-stake 
protocol is the staked amount of cryptocurrency (i.e., the validator 
proves that they have met the staking requirement by “storing” the 
tokens in their digital wallet address and keeping such wallet online 
and connected to the network to automatically broadcast the wallet’s 
balance).40 The larger the share of cryptocurrency staked by the node, 
                                                             
Reward?, BITCOIN MINING (May 6, 2016), http://bit.do/Draupnir_Bitcoin-mining-block-reward. 
 34. Nakamoto, supra note 11. 
 35. Nakamoto, supra note 11, at 4 (“The steady addition of a constant of amount of new 
coins is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation.”). 
 36. See 2Miners Team, Mining Difficulty and Network Hashrate Explained, 2MINERS (last 
updated Aug. 31, 2017), http://bit.do/2miners_Mining-difficulty. If the network is spammed, the 
coin will depreciate and slow the network from finding true blocks of transactions; the 
transactions will remain in a backlog, further devaluing the currency.  
 37. Karl J. O’Dwyer & David Malone, Bitcoin Mining and its Energy Footprint, 25 IET 
IRISH SIGNALS & SYSTEMS CONF. PROC. 280, at 281-82 (2014) (discussing the technical aspects 
of difficulty and its environmental impact). 
 38. Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, DIGICONOMIST, 
http://bit.do/Digiconomist_Bitcoin-energy-consumption (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
 39. Proof of Stake FAQ, supra note 24. 
 40. Id. 
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the greater is the node operator’s opportunity to validate and create a 
block of transactions on the blockchain and receive the associated 
transaction fees.  
There are several protocol variations used to determine which 
validator node is assigned the right to create the next block and thus 
receive the transaction fees attributed to it. Some proof-of-stake 
protocols employ a lottery system such that even small stakeholders 
can create blocks and earn transaction fees or even just to ensure 
general fairness of allocating the right to create the next block in the 
blockchain among holders of the same size.41 Other protocols 
randomize the allocation of block creation and validation rights based 
on the length of time that a given set of cryptocurrency has been staked. 
In these cases, an amount of cryptocurrency must be staked for a 
minimum number of days for a given node to be eligible to form a 
block, and once that set of cryptocurrency tokens has enabled the node 
to form a block, the counter resets. The cryptocurrency tokens must be 
staked again for the requisite length of time in order for the node to be 
able to form another block.42 Larger and older sets of staked tokens 
have a greater chance of forming the next block.  
Irrespective of these variations, instead of mining with 
computational hardware of mining rigs, one simply uses their 
cryptocurrency tokens they hold and sends them to a special address to 
validate transactions, create blocks and earn transaction fees as a result. 
The advantages of this method over proof of work are clear, both from 
a cost and environmental perspective. As discussed above, proof-of-
work mining is programmed to require more effort and thus greater 
energy consumption to create, validate and verify blocks of 
transactions as more miners join. There is no such negative externality 
in proof-of-stake protocols. Proof of stake is energy efficient compared 
to proof of work.  
A subset of proof-of-stake protocols have implemented a feature 
known as a masternode. A masternode is a node (computer running 
software) that performs specials functions that other nodes in the 
network do not. Like other proof-of-stake nodes, masternodes also 
require staking a certain amount of cryptocurrency, but this amount is 
usually significantly larger than that of other nodes, and there is an 
additional upfront cost of cryptocurrency that must be contributed to 
run a masternode. Masternodes facilitate instant transactions, private 
                                                             
 41. Nxt Community, Nxt Whitepaper, Revision 4, NXT (July 12, 2014), 
http://bit.do/Nxt_White-paper (NXT is a protocol that uses a proof-of-stake lottery). 
 42. King et al., supra note 27. 
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transactions and decentralized governance voting.43 Masternodes are a 
source of passive income for those that run them; they receive a portion 
of all block transaction fees, unlike other nodes, which only receive 
transaction fees from blocks they created. Some proof-of-work 
protocols include masternodes as well, but those masternodes still 
require staking of cryptocurrency tokens.44  
Malicious actors can write a script to vote fraudulently with 
respect to which transactions should be added to a block.45 The policy 
behind proof-of-stake is that those who hold a stake in a network are 
incentivized to act in the network’s interests and by requiring nodes to 
stake cryptocurrency in order to validate transactions and earn 
transaction fees, it becomes prohibitively expensive for a hostile 
takeover. Another benefit is that by locking up large amounts of the 
cryptocurrency in masternodes, the price can remain more stable as 
there is less circulating supply; a price crash is less likely. 
C. Why Cloud Mining? 
There are several barriers to entry into the proof-of-work mining 
economy: (i) there is a learning curve for operating and maximizing 
returns from an ASIC; and (ii) not everyone can afford (a) to buy, 
maintain, repair, or replace ASICs, or (b) to keep their computers 
running and connected to the network, either because such persons or 
entities need to use their computers for other purposes or because the 
energy costs are too high.46 In addition, the technology used to mine 
develops rapidly as there is a competitive hash rate arms race to receive 
the mining rewards.47 Hash Rate is the speed at which a computer is 
completing the proof-of-work cryptographic puzzles (guessing hashes 
that are each puzzles’ solution) required to generate a block.48 
                                                             
 43. Colin Harper, What are Masternodes? An Introduction and Guide, COINCENTRAL 
(Dec. 19, 2017), http://bit.do/Harper_Masternodes. 
 44. William M. Peaster, What are Masternodes? Complete Beginner’s Guide, 
BLOCKONOMI (Jan. 11, 2018), http://bit.do/Peaster_Masternodes. 
 45. See supra Part I.A regarding the need to protect the blockchain network and the concept 
of difficulty, which in the case of proof of stake is the analogue to the increase in tokens required 
to be staked to create blocks and validate transactions; see also Rosic, supra note 24. 
 46. Paul Gil, A Beginner's Guide to Cryptocoin Mining, LIFEWIRE (last updated Apr. 5, 
2018), http://bit.do/Gil_Beginners-guide. Moreover, the energy cost and heat generated must be 
managed. Costs also include cooling mechanisms for the equipment, which generate significant 
levels of heat, and the need to keep up with a proverbial “arms race” in which the speed of 
developments in computing technology can make any equipment owned obsolete. See JAN LOEYS 
ET AL., J.P. MORGAN PERSPECTIVES, DECRYPTING CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TECHNOLOGY, 
APPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES 59 (2018). 
 47. LOEYS ET AL., supra note 46, at 61. 
 48. Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN.ORG, http://bit.do/Bitcoin_Vocab (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
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Dedicating more computing (hashing) power to this effort solves the 
puzzles faster. In addition, ASICs must be kept at an optimal 
temperature.49 On a macro level, cryptocurrency mining is somewhat 
centralized, or at least an oligopoly, despite the decentralized nature of 
the software. For example, just five mining pools control almost 75% 
of the total hash rate devoted to Bitcoin mining, a discouraging statistic 
for smaller miners.50  
There are also barriers to entry into proof-of-stake mining: 
cryptocurrency users may be unable to keep large amounts of their 
cryptocurrency locked up or their wallets connected to the network for 
extended periods of time, and even if they can, users may need to 
transfer tokens to pay for goods and services, which reduces their 
staking amount and the corresponding block transaction fees. In 
addition, because the larger stakes are able to process more 
transactions, smaller cryptocurrency holders are at a disadvantage.51 
Regardless of the reason for not being able to mine directly, a 
solution exists: hire someone else to mine for you. This is the essence 
of “cloud mining.” The user receives the block rewards and/or 
transactions fees from mining or transaction validation without 
managing the hardware and node software.52 There are a variety of 
structures to accomplish this for proof-of-work mining protocols, such 
as (i) the customer sends their already owned ASIC to a cloud mining 
company or purchases a new ASIC from such cloud mining company 
and sends the ASIC to such company—the ASIC is managed, serviced, 
and operated by the cloud mining company and the customer receives 
the cryptocurrency and or/transaction fees generated by such ASIC;53 
(ii) the customer rents an ASIC (or a fraction of an ASIC) that is 
managed, serviced, and operated by someone else and receives the 
cryptocurrency and or/transaction fees (or a fraction thereof) generated 
                                                             
 49. Joon Ian Wong, Cryptocurrency Miners Turn to Exotic Cooling Systems as 
Competition Heats Up, COINDESK (last updated Dec. 4, 2014, 5:08 PM), 
http://bit.do/Wong_Cryptocurrency-miners.  
 50. Hashrate Distribution: An Estimation of Hashrate Distribution amongst the Largest 
Mining Pools, BLOCKCHAIN (last visited Apr. 11, 2018), http://bit.do/blockchain_Hashrate 
 51. See Buterin, Proof of Stake FAQ, supra note 24.  
 52. DAVID LEE & KUO CHUEN, HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, 
INNOVATION, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA 47-56 (2015); see also Krishnan et al., 
supra note 5. 
 53. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN MINER HOSTING SOLUTIONS, 
http://bit.do/Bitcoin-Miner-Hosting_FAQ (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (proof-of-work cloud 
mining in which customers own the ASICs, receive the proceeds of its mining rewards and/or 
transaction fees; customers are also given virtual private network (VPN) access to their own 
ASICs); Turnkey Mining, MINING COLOCATION, http://bit.do/Turnkey-mining (last visited Mar. 
18, 2018) (proof-of-work cloud mining in which customers own the ASICs, receive the proceeds 
of its mining rewards and/or transaction fees). 
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by such ASIC; (iii) the customer buys the right to receive the 
cryptocurrency and/or transaction fees mined from a fixed hash rate 
(i.e., rents the hashing power); (iv) the customer buys the right to 
receive the cryptocurrency and/or transaction fees mined from a fixed 
amount of energy (i.e., rents the energy) (without specifying the ASIC 
used or hashing power); or (v) less transparent arrangements where the 
customer purchases interests that entitle such purchaser to a share of 
the cryptocurrency mining reward and/or transaction fees that a cloud 
mining venture generates (the customer does not rent or own any 
ASICs, in whole or in part, and the customer does not pay for the output 
attributable to a given hashrate or unit of energy).54 For proof-of-stake 
cloud mining, relatively small amounts of cryptocurrency received 
from each customer are pooled together. By aggregating several small 
shares of cryptocurrency into a pool, the chance to mine is higher than 
if it is done separately for each share, and the profit is divided among 
all pool members pro rata in accordance with their individual 
contribution of cryptocurrency.55 The persons or entities that operate 
                                                             
 54. See BITCOIN MINER HOSTING SOLUTIONS, supra note 53; MINING COLOCATION, supra 
note 53. See also, e.g., HASHFLARE, http://bit.do/HashFlare_co (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (No 
transparency into hardware used. Customers purchase the rights to the proceeds attributable to a 
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customers of HashFlare depending on their share of hashrate in the whole system.); Pricing, 
GENESIS MINING, http://bit.do/Genesis-Mining_Pricing (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (No 
transparency into hardware used. Customers purchase the rights to the proceeds attributable to a 
fixed hashrate.); How it Works, HASHING24, http://bit.do/Hashing24_howitworks (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2018) (No transparency into hardware used. Customers purchase the rights to the 
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V5 Contract, HASHNEST, http://bit.do/HashNest_Contract (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (Full 
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rights to the proceeds attributable to a fixed hashrate.); Token Offer Document, HYDROMINER, 
http://bit.do/Hydrominer_ICO (Oct. 17, 2017) (Limited transparency into hardware used, but the 
company claims in the offering document that it intends to disclose this information in the future. 
Customers pay for a unit of energy. The Company claims that it will periodically update and 
replace the hardware used.); Sales & Hashrate Hosting Contracts, HASHNEST, 
http://bit.do/HashNest_Sales (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) (Depending on the amount of hashing 
power purchased by customers, customers either share the output of a specified ASIC (for smaller 
purchasers) or own an ASIC and may request its physical delivery or continue to have the ASIC 
managed by HashNest’s cloud mining service. The ownership arrangement is for customers 
holding enough hashing power to constitute an entire machine of the associated type (e.g., 12500 
GH/s of Antminer S7), who are eligible to convert that amount of GH/s into the used unit of the 
associated type.); Whitepaper on Initial Coin Offering, ICE ROCK MINING, 
http://bit.do/IceRockMining (last updated Feb. 2, 2018) (Proof-of-work cloud mining in which 
the customers purchase interests that entitle such purchaser to a share of the cryptocurrency 
mining reward and/or transaction fees that a cloud mining venture generates—the customer does 
not rent or own any ASICs, in whole or in part, and the customer does not pay for the output 
attributable to a given hashrate or unit of energy.). 
 55. Overview of Cloud PoW and PoS Mining, ATBCOIN, http://bit.do/Atbcoin_Overview 
(last updated Aug. 7, 2017) (“Since not everyone can keep their wallet in the network for 24 hours, 
this problem is quickly resolved with the help of pools of depositors accepting various 
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the cloud mining business receive either a fixed or variable fee for their 
mining management services and to cover expenses.56 If cloud mining 
could be rationalized in one phrase, it would be “economies of scale.” 
Not all companies engaged in this line of business refer to 
themselves as cloud mining operations. While there are a handful of 
large cloud mining companies that can be found by searching such 
terms on the internet, there are several operations that offer remote 
mining arrangements that are not found on cloud mining marketplaces 
or sites.57 Some of these lesser known remote mining arrangements 
raise capital through initial coin offerings. Whether sold through an 
ICO, website or on an online marketplace, cloud mining businesses 
almost always engage in general solicitation to the public at large. 
Investors should look beyond mere nomenclature when doing their due 
diligence. 
II. REGULATORY AGENCY AWARENESS 
Although not directly homing in on cloud mining, several U.S. 
federal regulatory agencies have engaged with the topic of 
cryptocurrency mining as early as in 2014. This section surveys some 
key responses from FinCEN, the IRS, and the FTC. 
A. FinCEN 
The U.S. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, as amended, (“BSA”) was 
passed to detect and prevent money laundering. The BSA and its 
implementing regulations require MSBs to register with FinCEN by 
filing a Registration of Money Services Business (“RMSB”) and 
renewing the registration every two years.58 Operation of an MSB 
                                                             
cryptocurrency or, in other words, using cloud-based PoS mining. The terms of this kind of mining 
also became attractive for those miners who have a small share, since when connecting small 
shares into the pool, the chance to mine is higher than separately and the profit is divided among 
all pool members in proportion to their shares.”). See, e.g., Cloud Staking, STEAK CLOUD, 
http://bit.do/SteakCloud_Cloud-staking (last visited Apr. 11, 2018) (“Now anyone can stake 
[proof-of-stake] coins without the need to run a wallet on a computer 24/7. Pooled minting also 
offers bigger [proof-of-stake] mining rewards.”); see also About Us, STAKEMINERS, 
http://bit.do/StakeMiners_About (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (“As our staking pool is quite large, 
over 100 BTC worth of various Altcoins. Each week the new altcoins we receive become your 
earnings which are then payed [sic] out to you based on the percentage of Stakeminers you own. 
If you own 5% of Stakeminers, then you will receive 5% of the weeks earnings. The cycle is 
simple: the more coins we hold, the more coins we can stake, the more coins we stake, the more 
earning generated each week, and the more payout you will receive.”). 
 56. See infra note 132 (citing examples of cloud mining company fee types and structures). 
 57. Some of these alternative names are “colocation,” “cloud hosting,” or “hosted mining.” 
See Hosted Mining Knowledge Center, HOSTED MINING, http://bit.do/StakeMiners_howitworks 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
 58. See 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012) (“Registration of money transmitting businesses”); 31 
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without the appropriate registration also violates federal criminal law.59 
This requirement is separate from U.S. state licensing requirements.  
Certain issuers and exchangers of cryptocurrencies have been 
required to register with FinCEN as MSBs. On March 18, 2013, 
FinCEN published guidance (the “Guidance”) announcing that it 
would make no distinction between transmitters of government (or 
“fiat”) currency (such transmitters, a type of MSB) and transmitters of 
Bitcoin, which it now famously referred to as a “decentralized 
convertible virtual currency,” rather than by name itself.60 FinCEN’s 
regulations define the term “money transmitter” as a person that 
provides money transmission services, or any other person engaged in 
the transfer of funds. The term “money transmission services” means 
“the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for 
currency from one person and the transmission of currency, funds, or 
other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person 
by any means.”61  
According to the Guidance, “virtual currency” is a medium of 
exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but does 
not have all of the attributes of real currency. In particular, virtual 
currency does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction. The 
Guidance addresses “convertible virtual currency.” This type of virtual 
currency either has an equivalent value in real currency, or acts as a 
substitute for real currency.62  
The Guidance states that exchangers and administrators of virtual 
currencies are money transmitters under FinCEN’s regulations, and 
therefore are required to register with FinCEN as an MSB, unless they 
fall within an exemption from the definition under the BSA.63 An 
                                                             
C.F.R. § 1022.380 (2011) (“Registration of money services businesses”). 
 59. See 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d) (2011) (Once registered, a money services business is 
subject to certain provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act, e.g., an MSB is required to develop, 
implement, and maintain AML and KYC policies and procedures and file suspicious activity 
reports (“SARs”)); see also FinCEN Interpretive Release 2004-1, Anti-Money Laundering 
Program Requirements for Money Service Businesses With Respect to Foreign Agents or Foreign 
Counterparties, 69 Fed. Reg. 74,439, 74,441 (Dec. 14, 2004) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103). 
MSBs must also comply with the Funds Transfer Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.410(e), and Funds Travel 
Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.410(f), which require collection and recordkeeping of certain information 
about the transmitting party. MSBs are also subject to examination by FinCEN, the CFPB, or the 
IRS.  
 60. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dept. of the Treasury, Guidance Letter on 
Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual 
Currencies, FIN-2013-G001 (Mar. 18, 2013), http://bit.do/FinCEN_Guidanceletter [hereinafter 
FIN-2013-G001 Letter]. 
 61. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A)-(B). 
 62. FIN-2013-G001 Letter, supra note 60, at 1. 
 63. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii). 
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exchanger is defined as a person or entity “engaged as a business in the 
exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other virtual 
currency.” An administrator of virtual currency is defined as a person 
or entity “engaged as a business in issuing (putting into circulation) a 
virtual currency, and who has the authority to redeem (to withdraw 
from circulation) such virtual currency.”64 
The Guidance further states that an administrator or exchanger 
that (1) accepts and transmits a convertible virtual currency or (2) buys 
or sells convertible virtual currency for any reason is a money 
transmitter under FinCEN’s regulations, unless a limitation to or 
exemption from the definition applies to the person.65 Finally, the 
Guidance states “a person that creates units of convertible virtual 
currency and sells those units to another person for real currency or its 
equivalent is engaged in transmission to another location and is a 
money transmitter.”66 
FinCEN updated its guidance on January 30, 2014 to exclude 
“miners” from the registration, reporting, and recordkeeping 
regulations for MSBs.67 This is the case whether the user mining and 
using the Bitcoin is an individual or a corporation, and whether the user 
is purchasing goods or services for the user’s own use, paying debts 
previously incurred in the ordinary course of business, or (in the case 
of a corporate user) making distributions to shareholders. FinCEN 
wrote that:  
To the extent that a user mines Bitcoin and uses the Bitcoin 
solely for the user’s own purposes and not for the benefit of 
another, the user is not an MSB under FinCEN’s regulations, 
because these activities involve neither “acceptance” nor 
“transmission” of the convertible virtual currency and are not 
the transmission of funds within the meaning of the Rule.68 
A miner’s conversion of Bitcoin into a real currency or another 
convertible virtual currency, therefore, does not in and of itself make 
the miner a money transmitter so long as the miner is undertaking the 
transaction solely for the miner’s own purposes and not as a business 
service performed for the benefit of another.69 Cloud mining 
companies, therefore, may be considered money transmitters required 
to register as MSBs because they accept and transmit cryptocurrency 
                                                             
 64. FIN-2013-G001 Letter, supra note 60, at 2. 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. Id. at 5. 
 67. Id. at 3. 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. 
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on behalf of others and are compensated in connection with such 
services.70 
B. IRS 
On March 25, 2014 the IRS issued Notice IR-2014-36, providing 
answers to frequently asked questions on cryptocurrency, such as 
Bitcoin.71 These FAQs provide basic information on the U.S. federal 
tax implications of transactions in, or transactions that use, 
cryptocurrency. The notice provides that cryptocurrency is treated as 
property (not currency) for U.S. federal tax purposes.72 General tax 
principles that apply to property transactions apply to transactions 
using cryptocurrency. If the fair market value of property received in 
exchange for cryptocurrency exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis of 
the cryptocurrency, the taxpayer has taxable gain. The taxpayer has a 
loss if the fair market value of the property received is less than the 
adjusted basis of the cryptocurrency.73 In certain cases, such losses are 
deductible. The character of gain or loss (whether capital gains/losses 
or short-term gains/losses) from the sale or exchange of cryptocurrency 
depends on whether the cryptocurrency is a capital asset in the hands 
of the taxpayer.74 
The IRS also provided clarity with respect to miners. For instance, 
a taxpayer who mines cryptocurrency realizes gross income upon 
receipt of the cryptocurrency resulting from those activities.75 The fair 
market value of the cryptocurrency as of the date of receipt is includible 
in gross income. If a taxpayer’s “mining” of cryptocurrency constitutes 
a trade or business, and the “mining” activity is not undertaken by the 
taxpayer as an employee, the net earnings from self-employment 
(generally, gross income derived from carrying on a trade or business 
less allowable deductions) resulting from those activities constitute 
self-employment income and are subject to the self-employment tax.76 
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C. FTC 
On September 15, 2014, the FTC brought a civil action under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) against Butterfly Labs, a 
Wyoming corporation with Kansas and Missouri offices.77 The FTC 
Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce” and authorizes the FTC to enforce those prohibitions.78 The 
FTC charged Butterfly Labs with engaging in deceptive practices in 
violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.79 The complaint alleged that 
Butterfly misled consumers who prepaid for Bitcoin mining machines 
and cloud mining services that the company sold on the Facebook, 
Twitter and elsewhere on the Internet. According to the allegations, 
mining hardware and services that Butterfly sold from its website and 
through Facebook and Twitter were either not delivered as promised 
or, if delivered, arrived damaged or failed to produce Bitcoins 
profitably, as advertised.80 Without hearing from the Butterfly, the 
court, on September 18, 2014, issued a temporary order freezing 
Butterfly’s assets, appointing a receiver, and granting the FTC 
immediate access to the company’s premises and records. According 
to the complaint, buyers of these mining machines were misled by 
assertions that the machines would solve the cryptographic math 
puzzles involved in mining Bitcoin and that buyers of the Butterfly 
mining machines or services would receive Bitcoin as rewards for 
solving these puzzles at a rate to make up for the cost of the initial 
outlay and, in short order, show a profit.81  
In approximately December 2013, Butterfly Labs began offering 
cloud mining services, at an average upfront cost of approximately 
$10/GH for 12 months, whereby Butterfly Labs supposedly would use 
and manage the mining machines purchased by customers to generate 
Bitcoins for such customers. Butterfly Labs stated that the service 
would allow consumers to “harness the power of the latest Bitcoin 
mining technology’ without any ‘technical knowledge’” and that 
Butterfly Labs “would begin generating Bitcoins for consumers who 
paid for these services in the ‘March 2014 time frame.’”82 Butterfly 
Labs failed to do so. As of August 2014, the defendants had not 
                                                             
 77. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 1-2, FTC v. BF 
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generated any Bitcoins for consumers who had purchased the mining 
services, often at a cost of thousands of dollars per consumer.83 
According to the FTC, consumers could not produce Bitcoins, the 
company was unjustly enriched, and the court’s intervention was 
required to stop a continuing substantial injury to consumers.84 The 
court found that the FTC had offered sufficient evidence for the court 
to conclude that Butterfly had likely violated and would continue to 
violate the FTC Act.85 The court granting a temporary restraining order 
further concluded that consumers would likely suffer “immediate and 
continuing harm” unless the court stopped the Butterfly operation.86 In 
February 2016, Butterfly Labs’ Sonny Vleisides and Darla Drake 
agreed to settle with the FTC.87 The settlement orders include partially 
suspended monetary judgments, the settlements also include monetary 
judgments that are partially suspended due to the defendants’ inability 
to pay.88 Against Butterfly Labs and Vleisides, the judgment is 
$38,615,161, which will be suspended upon Butterfly Labs’ payment 
of $15,000, and Vleisides’ payment of $4,000. Against Drake, the 
judgment is $135,878, which will be suspended once she surrenders the 
cash value of all Bitcoins she obtained using company machines.89 
III. CERTAIN SECURITIES CONSIDERATIONS 
Certain cloud mining models, particularly the less transparent 
versions, are susceptible to being deemed investment contracts that are 
securities under the Securities Act.90 Cloud mining is the new the citrus 
grove from the seminal Howey case.91 While the various circuit courts 
have expounded upon the standard used in Howey and developed their 
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own chains of precedent,92 the original case itself is plainly applicable 
to cloud mining. 
A. The Howey Case 
In Howey, the Supreme Court interpreted what would constitute 
an “investment contract” under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act.93 
Specifically, the Court considered “whether, under the circumstances, 
the land sales contract, the warranty deed and the service contract 
together constitute an ‘investment contract.’”94  
Each customer was offered both a land sales contract (for a 
uniform purchase price per acre or fraction thereof) and a service 
contract, after having been told that it was not feasible to invest in a 
grove unless service arrangements were made, and the superiority of 
Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. was stressed for this purpose.95 The 
price per contract varied in amount only in accordance with the number 
of years the particular plot had been planted with citrus trees.96 At this 
point, the facts of the case became determinative in the securities 
analysis: 
These land tracts are not separately fenced, and the sole 
indication of several ownership is found in small land marks 
intelligible only through a plat book record… Without the 
consent of the company, the landowner or purchaser has no 
right of entry to market the crop and thus, there is ordinarily 
no right to specific fruit. The company is accountable only for 
an allocation of the net profits based upon a check made at the 
time of picking.97 
The Supreme Court used a legal standard that has become known 
as the Howey Test.98 Under this test, a contract constitutes an 
investment contract that meets the definition of security if there is (i) 
an investment of money; (ii) in a common enterprise; (iii) with an 
expectation of profits; (iv) derived solely from the efforts of others 
(e.g., a promoter or third party), “regardless of whether the shares in 
the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal 
interest in the physical assets used by the enterprise.”99 
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Focusing on the remote relationship and limited role, if any, that 
the purchasers had in the economic arrangement, the Court concluded 
and held that W. J. Howey Co. and Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. 
offered something other than a farm or orchard coupled with 
management services:  
They are offering an opportunity to contribute money and to 
share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed 
and partly owned by respondents. They are offering this 
opportunity to persons who reside in distant localities and 
who lack the equipment and experience requisite to the 
cultivation, harvesting, and marketing of the citrus products 
Such persons have no desire to occupy the land, or to develop 
it themselves; they are attracted solely by the prospects of a 
return on their investment.100  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized the collective 
characteristic of the enterprise; it was only feasible/profitable to 
cultivate the land on a large scale rather than on a tract by tract basis.101 
As noted above, the land tracts were narrow strips that were one tree 
wide: 
[I]ndividual development of the plots of land that are offered 
and sold would seldom be economically feasible, due to their 
small size. Such tracts gain utility as citrus groves only when 
cultivated and developed as component parts of a larger area. 
A common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties 
with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential 
if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return 
on their investments.102  
Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the arrangements 
whereby the investors’ interests are made manifest involve investment 
contracts, regardless of the legal terminology in which such contracts 
are clothed.103 With respect to certain cloud mining and initial coin 
offerings, this statement means that the SEC and courts will find 
investment contracts notwithstanding the technological novelty and 
nomenclature—it is a substance over form, fact-specific analysis. 
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B. Application to Cloud Mining 
Cloud mining arrangements can be viewed as a high-tech version 
of the Howey case land sales contract and service contract. In addition 
to the economic reality, cloud mining arrangements share the same 
concerns that the Supreme Court homed in on—namely, economic 
inducements, remote position of the purchaser, insufficient 
demarcation of the property of and resulting payment to the purchaser, 
limited investor role leading to reliance on the management and control 
of the promoter/seller/manager, and implied economies of scale.104 
Those who engage in cloud mining generally are seeking the 
cryptocurrency and transaction fees generated therefrom. The 
customers contribute money and rely on the expertise of the cloud 
mining company to manage, operate, repair, and replace the mining 
equipment. Whether customers are told that they receive rights to 
specific hardware, energy, hashing power, or simply a pro rata share 
of the cryptocurrency and/or transaction fees generated from mining 
depends on the specific cloud mining service.105 As discussed in 
Section I above, economies of scale (and thus pooling of funds and 
correlation of returns among the various investors) is a defining 
characteristic of both proof-of-work and proof-of-stake mining on their 
own and in a cloud mining arrangement.106 For these reasons, the 
characteristics of cloud mining are easily transposed into the Howey 
case itself, without much need for the case law that followed over the 
next few decades. 
Nonetheless, it is straightforward to analyze cloud mining under 
the Howey Test and the circuit court cases that expounded it. Howey 
defines an “investment contract” as:  
[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests 
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits 
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party . . . 
regardless of whether the shares in the enterprise are 
evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interest in the 
physical assets used by the enterprise.107  
Circuit courts have construed this definition as a multi prong test: (i) 
an investment of money; (ii) in a common enterprise; (iii) with the 
                                                             
 104. Id. at 299-300. 
 105. See Buterin, Proof of Stake FAQ, supra note 24; LEE & CHUEN, supra note 52; BITCOIN 
MINER HOSTING SOLUTIONS, supra note 53 (citing specific examples of cloud mining 
companies). 
 106. See supra Section I. Like the citrus groves in Howey, it would “seldom be 
economically feasible” to mine cryptocurrency as an individual. Howey, 328 U.S at 300. 
 107. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293. 
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expectation of profits; (iv) derived solely from the efforts of others 
(e.g., a promoter or third party).108 The discussion will exclude the first 
element, “an investment of money,” as it is typically not a disputed 
element in a case and is generally understood to include any form of 
consideration, including cryptocurrency itself.109 
1. Common Enterprise 
There is some disarray among the various circuit courts as to the 
ascertainment of whether a common enterprise exists.110 The circuits 
are split among three approaches: (i) horizontal commonality; (ii) 
narrow (or strict) vertical commonality and (iii) broad vertical 
commonality.111 In S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004), the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Howey analysis but declined to 
conclusively resolve the circuit split.112 
Horizontal Commonality 
Horizontal commonality is satisfied when there is a pooling of 
investor funds or assets such that the returns are correlated; the 
investors share in the risks and losses of the venture pro rata.113 The 
D.C., First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits use 
horizontal commonality.114 Commentators note that while the First, 
                                                             
 108. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 41-47 (6th ed. 2009). See 
cases cited infra notes 110-67. 
 109. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979); Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2001); Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432-33 (9th 
Cir. 1976); United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (2014) (“Bitcoin clearly qualifies as 
‘money’…”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, Civ. No. 4:13–CV–416, 2013 WL 4028182, at 
*2 (2013) (stating that paying in bitcoin satisfies the “investment of money” prong of the Howey 
Test). 
 110. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 49 (“Courts are in some disarray as to the legal rules associated 
with the ascertainment of a common enterprise . . . . Many courts require a showing of horizontal 
commonality . . . . Other courts have modeled the concept of a common enterprise around fact 
patterns in which an investor’s fortunes are tied to the promoter’s success rather than to the 
fortunes of his or her fellow investors. This doctrine, known as vertical commonality, has two 
variants[:] . . . [b]road vertical commonality . . . [and] . . . narrow vertical commonality.”) (internal 
citations omitted). See also FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA ET AL. 69 AM. JUR. 2D SEC. REG.—FED. § 
38-41 (2018); Ryan Borneman, Why the Common Enterprise Test Lacks a Common Definition: A 
Look Into the Supreme Court's Decision of SEC v. Edwards, 5 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 16 (2005); 
See infra Gordon note 115. 
 111. See AMENDOLA ET AL., supra note 110; see also Borneman, supra note 110.  
 112. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004). 
 113. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Banner Fund Int’l et al., 211 F.3d 602, 614 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); SG Ltd., 265 F.3d, at 49; Revak v. Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994); Salcer v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982); Teague v. Bakker, 
35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994); Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 394 (6th 
Cir. 1989); Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994).  
 114. See cases cited supra note 113. 
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Fourth, and D.C. Circuits accept horizontal commonality, these courts 
have not ruled one way or another on vertical commonality.115 
Proof-of-stake cloud mining, by definition, involves the pooling 
of investor funds or assets such that investors share in the 
cryptocurrency mined in accordance with the stake of cryptocurrency 
such investors contributed.116 Economies of scale is the underlying 
thesis that propels the use of proof-of-stake cloud mining.117 Like in 
Howey , wherein the citrus groves were generally not demarcated from 
one another and were cultivated as a whole because each strip only 
would “gain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed 
as component parts of a larger area,”118 the cryptocurrency contributed 
by each investor is pooled into a single wallet node to allow for greater 
proof-of-stake mining capability.119 And just as W. J. Howey Co. was 
accountable only for an allocation of the net profits based upon a check 
made at the time of picking, cryptocurrency mined and transaction fees 
earned are distributed to the investors pro rata at specified periods.120  
Whether there is horizontal commonality present in proof-of-
work cloud mining arrangements depends on the facts and 
circumstances. Certain proof-of-work cloud-mining arrangements 
clearly assign users to a piece of hardware that is used to mine on each 
user’s behalf, without pooling, and the user pays the mining company 
a fee for maintenance and operation services.121 These arrangements 
are more like renting or purchasing specific, individual computer 
hardware. Each user’s profits and losses are generally independent of 
other users’ and should not be seen as horizontal commonality (it is 
worth noting that different ASIC models and setups can generate 
different mining rewards than other ASIC models and setups). 
However, if multiple users shared one or more ASICs or if separately 
                                                             
 115. See James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 
OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 66-70 (reviewing circuit court cases). 
 116. See, e.g., STEAKCLOUD, supra note 55; STAKEMINERS, supra note 55.  
 117. STAKEMINERS, supra note 55 (“The more coins we stake as a group the more you earn 
on a weekly basis. Each week we calculate what every member earned on their account, and a 
payment in BTC is then distributed to each participant.”). 
 118. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300. 
 119. As discussed in Section I.B supra, the larger the share of coins held by the user, the 
greater is their opportunity to mine. 
 120. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-301. See LEE & CHUEN, supra note 52, at 60. 
 121. See, e.g., HASHNEST, http://bit.do/HashNet_AntminerS9 (last visited Apr. 11, 2018) 
(Depending on the amount of hashing power purchased by customers, customers either share the 
output of a specified ASIC (for smaller purchasers) or own an ASIC and may request its physical 
delivery or continue to have the ASIC managed by HashNest’s cloud mining service. The 
ownership arrangement is for customers holding enough hashing power to constitute an entire 
machine of the associated type (e.g., 12500 GH/s of Antminer S7), who are eligible to convert 
that amount of GH/s into the used unit of the associated type.). 
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owned ASICs are still pooled together to increase their collective 
hashing power and likelihood of earning the mining rewards and/or 
transaction fees, horizontal commonality is likely to be satisfied, 
because the investors’ assets are pooled together and their returns 
directly correlated.  
Other arrangements are less transparent—users are not assigned a 
specific piece of hardware but are simply allocated cryptocurrency at 
specified periods pro rata.122 There are also some arrangements where 
users purchase the cryptocurrency generated from either a specific unit 
of the ASIC’s computing (hashing) power or a specific unit of energy 
used to power an ASIC.123 Such arrangements also tend to be less 
transparent due to the hashing power and energy yield diminishing 
returns under proof-of-work protocols and different returns contingent 
on the specific ASIC used (cloud mining companies may use a variety 
of different ASIC models).124 These realities should be properly 
disclosed to set investor expectations.125 Without true adherence to the 
business model and proper demarcation and assignment of a specific 
ASIC to a specific investor, hashing power- and energy-based cloud 
mining arrangements are at risk of collapsing into a simple pro rata 
allocation, rather than a true tracking of hashing power- or energy-
based yields. Moreover, cloud mining companies sometimes boast 
about high “uptimes.” Doing so may provide further evidence of 
pooling in less transparent cloud mining models, if the failure of one 
machine—even if temporary—would be compensated for with the 
proceeds attributable to other machines. Further customer diligence is 
                                                             
 122. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (citing specific examples); see also LEE & 
CHUEN, supra note 52, at 57-61. 
 123. Id. 
 124. LEE & CHUEN, supra note 52, at 58 (“With the consistent increase in the difficulty 
metric, the value of the hashrate that a user buys in a contract decreases over time. In some cases, 
such contracts turn out to be profitable, but for the majority, it ends up as a costly lesson.”); see 
also HYDROMINER, supra note 54, at 23 (“The choice to exchange the H2Os for electricity rather 
than a particular hash rate was made deliberately. An exchange for hash rates seems obvious at 
first, however a certain hash rate today may have little value in a few months from now. Looking 
at the past performance of various mining operations, it turns out that due to an increase of the 
mining difficulty over time, locking in a hash rate in this Initial Token Offering would be an 
economic disadvantage for Participants. . . . The Developer will continue to replace old parts of 
the mining hardware with new technology.”). Hydrominer customers pay for a unit of electricity; 
the company claims that it will periodically update and replace the hardware used. 
 125. There are risks associated with the Hydrominer model. Holding a unit of energy 
constant while failing to update the mining hardware as technology advances will yield 
diminishing and possibly negative returns as the mining difficulty increases. See Mining 
Hardware Comparison, BITCOIN WIKI (last visited Mar. 1, 2018), http://bit.do/Bitcoin-
Wiki_Mining-HW-Comparison; Non-specialized Hardware Comparison, BITCOIN WIKI (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2018), http://bit.do/Bitcoin-Wiki_Non-specialized-HW.  
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warranted with respect to this possibility in connection with the 
common enterprise determination. 
Vertical Commonality 
The two types of vertical commonality are broad vertical 
commonality and narrow (or strict) vertical commonality. Broad 
vertical commonality will be found when there is a promotor that the 
investor relies upon to earn a profit.126 The existence of this vertical 
promotor-investor relationship will generally suffice. On the other 
hand, narrow vertical commonality requires that the returns of the 
investor and promoter be correlated: they rise and fall together because 
the promoter has a financial stake in the investment at issue.127 The 
Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits use broad vertical commonality.128 
The Ninth Circuit recognizes narrow vertical commonality.129  
Broad vertical commonality is likely satisfied in all cloud mining 
arrangements, regardless of whether proof of stake or proof of work is 
the underlying mining protocol, because there is an investor-promoter 
relationship. Users are almost exclusively reliant on the cloud mining 
management company to generate profits. In the case of proof-of-work 
mining, the cloud mining company (i.e., the promoter) sets up, 
controls, operates, maintains, and repairs the ASIC hardware and runs 
the nodes to mine.130 In the case of proof-of-stake mining, the cloud 
mining company (i.e., the promoter) creates the pooled wallet, hosts it 
in a virtual machine and keeps the nodes running.131  
Narrow vertical commonality in cloud mining depends on the 
business model and fee arrangements of the cloud mining management 
company; some only charge a flat (not a percentage) 
management/service fee, while other companies mine alongside their 
customers or receive a percentage commission of the mining rewards 
                                                             
 126. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(“Broad vertical commonality . . . only requires a movant to show that the investors are dependent 
upon the expertise or efforts of the investment promoter for their returns.”). 
 127. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (requiring that the 
investors’ fortunes be “interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those 
seeking the investment or of third parties.”). 
 128. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 732 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 140–41 (5th Cir. 1989); McGill v. American Land & 
Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 924-25 (10th Cir. 1985); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 
494 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 129. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Eurobond Exchange, Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 
1994); SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 49. 
 130. See sources cited supra note 54. See also James E. Smith & Ravi Nair, The Architecture 
of Virtual Machines, 38 COMPUTER 32, 32–38 (2005), for a discussion of virtual machines. 
 131.  See CHUEN, supra note 52; see also Smith & Nair, supra note 130.  
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and transaction fees earned through mining or staking.132 Cloud mining 
companies that mine alongside their customers or receive a percentage 
commission of the mining rewards and transaction fees earned are 
likely to satisfy narrow vertical commonality because the profits of the 
investor and the promoter (i.e., the cloud mining company) are 
correlated; they rise and fall together.133 For the same reason, if a cloud 
mining company contributes its own cryptocurrency holdings to the 
pooled wallet in a proof-of-stake, narrow vertical commonality is 
almost certainly satisfied.134 
2. Expectation of Profits Solely Derived from the 
Efforts of Others 
Although generally phrased as separate prongs, the “expectation 
of profits” and “derived solely from the efforts of others” (i.e., efforts 
of the promoter/cloud mining company) prongs tend to be analyzed 
together.135 In “expectation of profits”, profit refers to the type of return 
                                                             
 132. Management fees or maintenance costs typically include any, or all, of the following: 
electricity cost, cooling, maintenance work, and hosting services. See, e.g., Fees, STEAK CLOUD, 
http://bit.do/Steak-Cloud_Fees (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (proof-of-stake cloud mining 
deducting a maintenance cost that is a percentage of customer staking profits); STAKEMINERS, 
supra note 55 (Proof-of-stake cloud mining with no maintenance fee charged, but there is a 2% 
fee charged on the total amount being withdrawn by a customer. The cloud mining company also 
stakes its own funds alongside customers.); PACMIC V5 Contract, supra note 54 (proof-of-work 
cloud mining in which customers do not pay any maintenance fees or electricity costs); ICE ROCK 
MINING, supra note 54 (proof-of-work cloud mining in which the cloud mining company charges 
a percentage maintenance fee while also allocating ten percent of customer profits to the cloud 
mining company’s management team); Terms and Conditions, HASHING24, 
http://bit.do/Hashing24_terms (last updated Apr. 2, 2018) (Proof-of-work cloud mining company 
service fee includes the cost of a one-time allocation of ordered hashing power, but customers 
will also pay a fixed daily maintenance fee per unit of hashing power purchased by the customer 
for the equipment maintenance and its power supply.). See GENESIS MINING, supra note 54 and 
see also Pricing, HASHFLARE, http://bit.do/HashFlare_Pricing (last visited Mar. 10, 2018), for 
proof-of-work cloud-mining companies charging a fixed daily maintenance fee per unit of hashing 
power purchased by the customer—for some cryptocurrencies, there is no fee. Sales & Hashrate 
Hosting Contracts, supra note 54 (proof-of-work cloud mining company charging a fixed daily 
maintenance fee per unit of hashing power purchased by the customer). For a proof-of-work cloud 
mining company charging users for electricity costs and a fixed hosting fee per ASIC, see BITCOIN 
MINER HOSTING SOLUTIONS, supra note 53; MINING COLOCATION, supra note 53 (there is no 
commission or profit taken from the cloud-mining management company). 
 133. See sources cited supra notes 129 and 132. 
 134.  For proof-of-stake examples, see STEAK CLOUD, supra note 132; STAKEMINERS, 
supra note 55.  
 135.  See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); Robinson v. Glynn, 
349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003); Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009); 
McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Jonathan 
Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the 
Democratization of Public Capital Markets 44 (Cardozo L. Sch. Leg. Stud. Research Paper No. 
527, Mar. 24, 2018) (treating “expectation of profits” and “solely from the efforts of others” as 
one prong); Jeffrey Alberts & Bertrand Fry, Is Bitcoin a Security?, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 
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or income an investor seeks or expects on their investment (not the 
profits of the cloud mining company/issuer itself) and may include, for 
example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of 
the investment, whether fixed or variable.136 In determining investor 
expectations, courts consider the marketing language used by the 
promoter.137 This prong is likely satisfied in many cloud mining 
examples, as the cloud mining companies—both on their own websites, 
other cryptocurrency websites, and social media—emphasize the 
returns on investment, and customers who participate in cloud mining 
are generally motivated by the expected returns of cryptocurrency and 
transaction fees generated from the mining activities.138 Furthermore, 
just as (i) W.J. Howey Co. told customers that it was not feasible to 
invest in a citrus grove unless service arrangements were made, and (ii) 
the superiority of Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. was stressed for this 
purpose, cloud mining companies generally discuss on their websites 
why cloud mining is economically and logistically superior to direct, 
individual mining.139  
                                                             
(2015) (treating “expectation of profits” and “solely from the efforts of others” as one prong). But 
see J. Scott Colesanti, Trotting Out the White Horse: How the S.E.C. can Handle Bitcoin’s Threat 
to American Investors, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 34-36 (2015) (treating “expectation of profits” 
and “solely from the efforts of others” as two separate prongs).   
 136. Edwards, 540 U.S. at 390 (“The profits this Court was speaking of in Howey are 
profits—in the sense of the income or return—that investors seek on their investment, not the 
profits of the scheme in which they invest, and may include, for example, dividends, other periodic 
payments, or the increased value of the investment. There is no reason to distinguish between 
promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns for purposes of the test, so 
understood.”). 
 137. See id. at 390 (“[T]he investing public is attracted by representations of investment 
income.”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946) (“[The investors] 
are attracted by the expectation of substantial profits. It was represented, for example, that profits 
during the 1943-1944 season mounted to 20% and that even greater profits might be expected 
during the 1944-1945 season . . . .”); Colesanti, supra note 135, at 34-35 (“In short, the 
‘expectation of profits’ element is often readily proven by the Promoter's wistful statements or 
advertising of successful commercial activities.”). 
 138. See, e.g., What Genesis Mining Offers, GENESIS MINING, http://bit.do/Genesis-
Mining_Offer (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (“No matter which package you choose, you are renting 
the latest technology, which guarantees maximum performance for as long as possible.”); 
HASHFLARE, supra note 54 (“With cloud mining . . . you start making money immediately on a 
daily basis.”); ICE ROCK MINING, supra note 54 (“With Ice Rock, investors become our partners 
and share in the realization of profits, while assuring themselves a stable and passive income. 
Because of our efficiencies, we are able to operate on lower costs and thereby pass those savings 
on to our investors. With today’s hashrates, our ROI to investors is over 200% per year, and could 
increase if the price of bitcoin appreciates.”); STAKEMINERS, supra note 55 (promising 
“consistent earnings stream each week”). 
 139. See, e.g., Isn’t Buying The Hardware Cheaper?, GENESIS MINING, 
http://bit.do/Genesis-Mining_CS (last visited Apr. 11, 2018) (“On the first glance one might think 
that buying miner X is slightly cheaper than hosted mining. However, there are a number of 
‘hidden’ costs related to purchasing and maintaining a miner that change the economics 
significantly . . . .”); HASHFLARE, supra note 54 (“With cloud mining you can make money and 
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However, the existence of an expected return or profit does not on 
its own mean that the cloud mining contract is an investment contract 
that constitutes a security. Rather, it is the passive nature of how the 
return is generated, as determined by the “efforts of others” analysis, 
that—assuming the other prongs are satisfied—establishes whether the 
instrument is an investment contract that would be considered a 
security.140 With respect to cloud mining contracts, this would be the 
passively derived cryptocurrency generated from the mining efforts of 
the cloud mining service company, i.e., from the efforts of others. 
Courts generally hold that “solely” should not be literally interpreted 
to mean “only,” and should instead be read flexibly as “primary,” 
“significant,” or “substantial” efforts of others.141 
In the case of cloud mining, the customers have virtually no 
control over the investment and generating returns; they rely 
substantially (or even solely) on the efforts of the cloud mining 
company.142 In the case of proof-of-stake mining, customers contribute 
cryptocurrency to a pooled wallet node that is set up and operated by 
the cloud mining company; with no effort on the part of the customer, 
the wallet passively generates income in the form of mining rewards of 
newly generated cryptocurrency/transaction fees earned.143 In the case 
of proof-of-work cloud mining, the cloud mining company houses, 
operates and services the ASICs that solve the equations necessary to 
                                                             
earn cryptocurrencies without major investment or hassle from direct involvement with hardware 
or software because we keep everything extremely convenient so you start making money 
immediately on a daily basis.”); Why use Hashing24?, HASHING24, http://bit.do/Hashing24_why 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (“With Hashing24, you do not need to worry about equipment, 
maintenance, power outages, or even bad weather. We handle everything for you so you can focus 
on mining. . . . We strive to provide you with the best prices for electricity and hardware 
maintenance. All Hashing24 clients receive rates equivalent to what the largest mining players 
pay for electricity and maintenance.”). 
 140. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300-01. 
 141. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 754-55 (11th 
Cir. 2007); Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. SG 
Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2001); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 
180, 187 (3d Cir. 2000); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 
1996); Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1460–62 (9th Cir. 1989); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. 
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Central Chinchilla 
Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1974); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Glenn W. Turner 
Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir. 1973); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d. 689, 692 (3d 
Cir. 1973). See also ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES 
LAWS § 9:69 (vol. 5B, 2017) (citing various cases and discussing standards applied by lower 
courts in the “efforts of others” prong); but see Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-20 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977) (suggesting that solely should be interpreted 
literally as only). 
 142. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (various cloud mining companies 
effectively handling the entire operation, with the customer as a purely passive participant).  
 143. Proof of Stake FAQ, supra note 24.  
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mine and generate cryptocurrency profits.144 Thus, the “efforts of 
others” prong is easily satisfied in the typical cloud mining fact pattern 
under both proof of stake and proof of work.145 
In summary, the determination of whether or not a cloud mining 
contract will be considered an investment contract security should 
depend on the interplay of three main criteria: (i) whether the cloud 
mining company engages in proof-of-work mining; (ii) whether one is 
in a jurisdiction that requires the horizontal commonality test; and (iii) 
if so, whether the cloud mining customer is assigned exclusive rights 
to specific ASIC machinery; the customer does not share or pool such 
ASIC or its rewards and transaction fees with other investors. For 
example, if (i)-(iii) are true, then the cloud mining arrangement may 
not be treated as a security, because investor funds or assets are not 
pooled, and their profits are not correlated with one another since each 
ASIC can be viewed as a separate vehicle that may or may not succeed 
in finding the next block to receive the associated cryptocurrency 
reward and/or transaction fees. However, proof-of-work cloud-mining 
contracts that pool ASICs, even if separately owned, are likely to be 
considered securities. Regulators should consider whether optional 
pooling and the ability of the customer to choose which specific pool 
to point their ASIC to would provide enough randomization and 
control such that horizontal commonality would not be satisfied due to 
a reduced level of correlation among customer fortunes, because each 
pool is technically competing with all other pools.  
In addition, a proof-of-stake cloud-mining company that only 
receives a fixed (as opposed to a percentage) management or service 
fee that is not tied to the profits of the customer should not be 
considered a security in jurisdictions that require strict vertical 
commonality, because the fortunes of the investor and the promoter are 
not tied together. In contrast, proof-of-stake mining almost always will 
be considered a security, clearly satisfying all prongs of the Howey 
Test, in all jurisdictions that follow the broad vertical commonality 
standard for the “common enterprise” prong of the Howey Test, 
because those jurisdictions merely look for an investor-promoter 
relationship and some level of dependence; this fact is evident in all 
specific proof-of-stake cloud mining arrangements surveyed, as well as 
                                                             
 144. See discussion supra Part I.B; see also sources cited supra note 24. 
 145. However, there is one wrinkle for regulators to consider: are situations in which the 
customer retains the ability to control (usually through a VPN) the ASIC hardware enough to 
negate the “efforts of others prong.” This possibility is unlikely, as discussed above, the 
substantial role of the promoter is generally sufficient and nominal rights, particularly if never 
exercised, are unlikely to change the outcome of the analysis. See sources cited supra note 141.  
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in the general concept of proof-of-stake cloud mining.146 And 
irrespective of whether a proof-of-work or proof-of-stake algorithm is 
used, if a cloud mining company mines or stakes alongside its 
customers in a mining pool, the arrangement is likely to be considered 
an investment contract that would be a security in jurisdictions that use 
the narrow vertical commonality standard.  
In short and as discussed above, the “expectation of profits” and 
“derived solely from the efforts of others” prongs are likely satisfied in 
most cases, thus the prong on which the analysis turns is likely the 
“common enterprise.” 
C. Recent SEC Enforcement Action 
To date, there has only been one enforcement action relating to 
cloud mining. On June 2, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Connecticut entered a final default judgment in a case brought by 
the SEC against two Connecticut-based companies, GAW Miners, 
LLC (“GAW Miners”) and ZenMiner, LLC (d/b/a ZenCloud) 
(“ZenMiner”), along with their principal, Homero Joshua Garza 
(“Garza” and together with GAW Miners and ZenMiner, the 
“Defendants”), alleging that GAW Miners and ZenMiner purported to 
offer securities to investors in their cryptocurrency mining operation.147  
Beginning in 2014, the Defendants sold shares in the returns from 
their (supposed) mining operations, via investment contracts that they 
named “Hashlets.”148 Hashlet contracts were “a divisible and 
assignable allocation of hashing power from GAW-owned and hosted 
mining hardware,” entitling their purchasers to a share of the profits 
from Defendants’ purported “hashing power,” or the computing power 
(measured in megahash per second), that GAW Miners and/or 
ZenMiner would supposedly earn by mining blockchain 
cryptocurrencies using the computers that were maintained in their data 
centers.149 Hashlets were purported to earn a return based on the 
number of cryptocurrency units generated when the pools to which 
their computing power was directed succeeded in processing and 
confirming cryptocurrency transactions.150 Unlike Cloud Hosted 
Mining customers, an older business model employed by GAW 
                                                             
 146. See sources cited supra notes 5, 52, and 55. 
 147. Homero Joshua Garza, GAW Miners, LLC, & ZenMiner, LLC, Litigation Release No. 
23885, No. 3:15-cv-01760 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2015). 
 148. Complaint at 2, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Homero Joshua Garza, No. 3:15-cv-01760 
(D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2015). 
 149. A “unit” of a Hashlet was a measurement of its hashing power, or the number of 
calculations it could perform per second. 
 150. Id. 
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Miners, Hashlet customers were not buying computer hardware.151 
Hashlet customers had no right to receive any piece of computer 
hardware at the expiration of their Hashlet contract.152 Instead, Hashlet 
customers were buying the rights to profit from a portion of the 
computing power owned by GAW Miners and/or ZenMiner.153  
The district court and the SEC noted that the arrangement was 
essentially a Ponzi scheme.154 GAW Miners and ZenMiner sold far 
more Hashlets worth of computing power than they actually had in 
their computing centers.155 There was no computer equipment to back 
up the vast majority of Hashlets that the Defendants sold. Because the 
Defendants sold far more computing power than they owned and 
dedicated to cryptocurrency mining, they owed investors a daily return 
that was larger than any actual return they were making on their limited 
mining operations.156 Investors were simply paid back gradually over 
time, as “returns,” the money that they, and others, had invested. 157 As 
a result, some investors’ funds were used to make payments to other 
investors, which investors later began to notice as they were not 
receiving payouts at expected intervals.158 Several investors 
experienced in blockchain technology and cryptocurrency mining 
began to suspect fraud.159 By November 2014, Hashlets became 
unprofitable.160 That is, the Hashlets’ daily maintenance fees exceeded 
their purported mining payouts.161 By January 2015, Hashlets were 
obsolete.162 GAW Miners announced the termination of its purported 
Hashlet mining operations at the end of January 2015, stating that 
                                                             
 151. Id. at 9-10. In the early stages of the business, customers were entitled to request that 
the computer equipment they had purportedly purchased be sent to them. However, even this 
arrangement was fraudulent since the company did not purchase enough mining equipment to 
fulfill all customer delivery requests. As the SEC noted, “Most customers paid for a phantom 
piece of equipment that neither GAW Miners nor ZenMiner owned. Neither GAW Miners nor 
ZenMiner was directing customers’ computing power to any pools at all, much less the ones 
customers believed they were choosing.” Id. at 10. 
 152. Id. at 11.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 17. 
 155. Id. at 3. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 3 (also based on private discussions with individuals that invested). 
BITCOINTALK, http://bit.do/BitcoinTalk (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (discussion on Bitcoin 
community forum in November 2014 amongst early investors suspecting fraud). 
 159. The blockchain cryptocurrency expertise of the person commenting is signaled by the 
rating such person has in the forum. Members are given a merit score as well. See BITCOINTALK, 
http://bit.do/BitcoinTalk1 (last visited Mar. 10, 2018).  
 160. Complaint at 16, Homero Joshua Garza, No. 3:15-cv-01760. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
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“GAW and ZenCloud mining operations have been indefinitely put on 
hold, effective immediately.”163  
In addition to the fraudulent nature of the business operations, 
there were also violations with respect to the marketing of the 
investment contracts: 
• Defendants misleadingly claimed that Hashlets would 
always be profitable and never obsolete, when they had 
no reasonable basis to support those claims.164  
• Defendants misleadingly claimed that Hashlets were 
engaged in mining for virtual currency through pools 
available in ZenCloud, when they knew that few Hashlets 
were supported by actual mining activity.165  
• Defendants misleadingly claimed that ZenPool engaged 
in mining, when they knew that it never did.166  
• Defendants claimed to assign investor funds to specific 
mining pools selected by the investors. This 
representation was false. ZenCloud confirmed that GAW 
Miners did not establish accounts with those pools and 
did not direct any of its computing power towards those 
pools.167 
The District Court for the District of Connecticut found that 
Hashlets constitute investment contracts and were thus considered 
“securities” under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act.168 No 
registration statement was filed with respect to the Hashlets sold by the 
Defendants, and no exemption from registration was available for these 
securities.169 As a result, the Defendants had violated Section 5 of the 
Securities Act.170 
The final judgment against GAW Miners and ZenMiner 
permanently enjoined each of them from violating Sections 5 and 17(a) 
of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
                                                             
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 15 (Garza also claimed on numerous occasions, including in a Hashtalk.org post 
in August 2014, words to the effect that “there will never be a time a Hashlet cost[s] more to run 
than you make, and they will always make money.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 17-18. 
 168. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (2015); Litigation Release No. 
23852. 
 169. Litigation Release No. 23852. 
 170. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c) (2015); Litigation Release No. 
23852. 
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of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.171 In addition, each were ordered 
to pay, jointly and severally, $10,384,099 in disgorgement and 
prejudgment interest.172 The final judgment also required each entity to 
pay a civil penalty of $1,000,000.173 Both GAW Miners and ZenMiner 
have ceased their former business operations.174 
D. Cloud Mining Company Conducts a Private Placement  
On February 25, 2016, one cloud mining company, Genesis 
Mining, filed a Form D in connection with the offering of interests in a 
private fund dedicated to cloud mining cryptocurrency.175 A pooled 
investment fund model is worth consideration for cloud mining 
companies, particularly those that are already pooling investor assets 
in any of the variety of ways discussed in Part III.B. Genesis Mining’s 
offering of fund interests in this case was conducted pursuant to Rule 
506(c) of the Securities Act.176 Rule 506(c) allows for “general 
solicitation” if the issuer takes reasonable steps to verify that the 
purchasers are accredited investors.177 This means that public offerings 
on the internet, social media, and elsewhere in the public domain can 
continue to be made to non-accredited investors, but only accredited 
investors may purchase such securities.178 
The SEC published additional guidance explaining Rule 
506(c),179 characterizing Rule 506(c) as setting forth a flexible, 
principles-based method of verification which requires an objective 
determination by the issuer (or those acting on its behalf) as to whether 
the steps taken are “reasonable” in the context of the particular facts 
and circumstances of each purchaser and transaction.180 Among the 
                                                             
 171. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c); Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 77q(a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5; Litigation Release No. 23852. 
 172. Litigation Release No. 23852. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. United States Securities & Exchange Commission, Form D – Notice of Exempt 
Offering of Securities, filed by Genesis Mining (Feb. 25, 2016), http://bit.do/SEC_FormD; see 
also Kyle Torpey, Genesis Mining Files With SEC for Bitcoin Mining Fund, BITCOIN MAG. (Mar. 
8, 2016, 9:17 AM), http://bit.do/Torpey_Genesis-Mining-Files. 
 176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ELIMINATING THE PROHIBITION AGAINST GENERAL 
SOLICITATION AND GENERAL ADVERTISING IN RULE 506 AND RULE 144A OFFERINGS: A SMALL 
ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE (last updated Sept 20, 2013), http://bit.do/SEC_Eliminating-the-
Prohibition.  
 180. Id. 
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factors that an issuer should consider under this principles-based 
method are: 
• the nature of the purchaser and the type of accredited 
investor that the purchaser claims to be;181 
• the amount and type of information that the issuer has 
about the purchaser;182 and 
• the nature of the offering, such as the manner in which the 
purchaser was solicited to participate in the offering, and 
the terms of the offering, such as a minimum investment 
amount.183 
Rule 506(c) also includes a non-exclusive list of verification 
methods that issuers may use, but are not required to use, when seeking 
greater certainty that they satisfy the verification requirement with 
respect to natural person purchasers. This non-exclusive list of 
verification methods consists of: 
• verification based on income, by reviewing copies of any 
Internal Revenue Service form that reports income, such 
as Form W-2, Form 1099, Schedule K-1 of Form 1065, 
and a filed Form 1040;184 
• verification on net worth, by reviewing specific types of 
documentation dated within the prior three months, such 
as bank statements, brokerage statements, certificates of 
deposit, tax assessments and a credit report from at least 
one of the nationwide consumer reporting agencies, and 
obtaining a written representation from the investor;185 
• a written confirmation from a registered broker-dealer, an 
SEC-registered investment adviser, a licensed attorney or 
a certified public accountant stating that such person or 
entity has taken reasonable steps to verify that the 
purchaser is an accredited investor within the last three 
months and has determined that such purchaser is an 
accredited investor; and 
• a method for verifying the accredited investor status of 
persons who had invested in the issuer’s Rule 506(b) 
offering as an accredited investor before September 23, 
2013 and remain investors of the issuer.186 
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In addition to conducting a private placement, a cloud mining 
company or fund seeking to comply with U.S. federal securities laws 
must consider the investor limits to avoid public filing requirements 
under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act: (i) Any U.S. issuer (i.e., a 
cloud mining fund) that has more than $10 million in total assets and a 
class of equity securities, like common stock, that is held of record by 
either (1) 2,000 or more persons or (2) 500 or more persons who are 
not accredited investors; or (ii) any non-U.S. issuer (non-U.S. cloud 
mining fund) that has over $10 million in total assets and a class of 
equity securities, like common stock, that is held of record by either (1) 
2,000 or greater worldwide or (2) 500 persons who are not accredited 
investors or greater worldwide; and the number of its U.S. resident 
holders is 300 or greater, must comply with public disclosure, 
reporting, and other obligations as a public company under the 
Exchange Act.187 The requirements include an obligation to file 
periodic reports on Form 10-K and Form 10-Q and current reports on 
Form 8-K.188 
In addition, although beyond the scope of this Article, private 
funds that invest in securities rely on exemptions from registration as 
an “investment company” under Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”).189 
This issue is particularly relevant if a cloud mining fund were to invest 
in securities, such as mining of blockchain tokens that are securities or 
purchasing interests in other cloud mining companies. As amended, the 
Investment Company Act defines an “investment company” as an 
issuer that “holds itself out as being engaged primarily or proposes to 
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in 
securities.” Entities generally seek an exemption from registration as 
an investment company under the Investment Company Act to avoid 
registration requirements, such as ongoing disclosure, disinterested 
directors, minimum capital requirements, and prohibitions on affiliated 
transactions and trading activities, such as short sales and derivatives 
                                                             
 187. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2016); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.12g3-2 (2008); 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (2016). This brief summary of the Exchange Act 
reporting considerations is purposefully abbreviated and omits a large number of rules and 
exceptions because a full analysis of the Exchange Act is beyond the scope of this article. For a 
more fulsome discussion with respect to non-U.S. funds, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
ACCESSING THE U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS – A BRIEF OVERVIEW FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS 
(last modified Dec. 4, 2017), http://bit.do/SEC_Foreign-private-issuers. With respect to U.S. 
funds, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EXCHANGE ACT REPORTING AND REGISTRATION (last 
modified Nov. 29, 2017), http://bit.do/SEC_Exchange-act-reporting.  
 188. 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2016). 
 189. Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 3(c)(1), 3(c)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3 (2010). 
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trading.190 In order to be exempt from registering as an investment 
company under these exemptions, the fund must: (1) not make, or 
propose to make, a public offering of its securities; and (2) either (a) 
limit the fund to no more than 100 investors (the 3(c)(1) exemption), 
or (b) limit the fund to “qualified purchasers” (the 3(c)(7) 
exemption).191 
A person or entity that manages a private fund may have to 
register as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 (“Advisers Act”). The Advisers Act defines an “investment 
adviser” as any person who, for compensation, engages in the business 
of advising others as to the value of securities or as to the advisability 
of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or who, for 
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates 
analyses or reports concerning securities.192 Most private equity, hedge, 
and real estate fund persons or entities advising private funds (i.e., 
funds relying on exemptions from registration as an “investment 
company” under Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment 
Company Act) with assets under management of $150 million or more 
“in the U.S.” must register as an investment adviser with the SEC.193  
                                                             
 190. U.S. Securities Laws Overview: Making Sense of “Accredited Investors,” “Qualified 
Purchasers,” and “Qualified Clients”, MORGAN, LEWIS & BLOCKIUS LLP (2015), 
http://bit.do/ML_Securities-law-overview. 
 191. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT COMPANY REGISTRATION AND 
REGULATION PACKAGE (last modified Feb. 19, 2013), http://bit.do/SEC_Investment-co-
registration. The term “public offering,” as used in Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act, has the same meaning that it has in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act. 
For a discussion of the private offering exemption, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINAL RULE: 
NONPUBLIC OFFERING EXEMPTION, Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 
http://bit.do/SEC_Final-Rule-Non-public-offering. See also U.S SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 
INTERPRETATION: USE OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Release No. 33-7856 (Apr. 28, 2000), 
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23, 1998), http://bit.do/SEC_Interpretation-Use-of-Internet-Web-Sites. 
 192. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). See U.S. SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS (Mar. 2013), 
http://bit.do/SEC_Regulation-of-Investment-Advisers, for a deeper discussion of what constitutes 
“investment advice.” 
 193. A lower $100 million assets under management threshold applies if the person or entity 
advises other products such as managed accounts or employee securities companies. Managers 
with assets under management less than the $100 million or $150 million threshold, as applicable 
(or, for managers having their principal office and place of business in the state of New York, less 
than $25 million) are subject to state regulation. Section 203A(a)(1) of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 prohibits any adviser from registering with the SEC that is regulated or is required to 
be regulated in the state in which it maintains its principal office and place of business, § 
203A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2015). The SEC interprets this provision to mean that the 
prohibition applies only to an adviser that maintains its principal office and place of business in a 
state that has enacted an investment adviser statute. U.S SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RULES 
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This Advisers Act registration concern could be relevant if a cloud 
mining fund were to invest in securities, such as mining of blockchain 
tokens that are securities or purchasing interests in other cloud mining 
companies. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the nascent technology, cloud mining can be 
analyzed using the longstanding securities law frameworks. 
When a customer is assigned specific, exclusive rights to the 
cryptocurrency rewards generated from a specific ASIC, proof-of-
work cloud-mining contracts should not be treated as a security in 
jurisdictions that require horizontal commonality. This type of cloud 
mining can be accomplished whether the customer owns the ASIC or 
rents such hardware. Customers sharing an ASIC or pooling separately 
owned ASICs would satisfy horizontal commonality and likely render 
each contract an investment contract security. In addition, a proof-of-
stake cloud-mining contract in which the company only receives a 
fixed management or service fee that is not tied to the profits of the 
customer should not be considered a security in jurisdictions that 
requires strict vertical commonality. In contrast, proof-of-stake cloud 
mining arrangements will almost always be considered a security, 
clearly satisfying all prongs of the Howey Test in jurisdictions that 
follow the broad vertical commonality. Cloud mining companies 
should also consider whether their mining or staking activities that 
occur alongside or with their customers might deem their cloud mining 
arrangements as securities. 
Proof-of-work cloud-mining companies should avoid less 
transparent models, such as contracts for energy or hash power rights 
that do not specify the ASIC model used, because energy and hash 
power yield different returns over time and depending on the specific 
model of ASIC.194 If two different investors pay the same for a unit of 
energy or hash power, but each investor is assigned a different ASIC 
model, different yields will result.195 A specific ASIC would have to be 
assigned and disclosed to the investor to accurately communicate their 
expected returns. Alternatively, the investors should pay a different 
amount for an equivalent unit of energy or hash power, depending on 
the model used.  
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Cloud mining companies should disclose that mining tends to 
yield diminishing returns over time unless technological adjustments 
are made. Thus, even if a cloud mining company assigns a specific 
ASIC to a specific user, the company must disclose that returns are 
expected to diminish over time and that the ASIC may become obsolete 
due to technological advancements and increasing mining difficulty. A 
cloud mining company must also disclose to investors whether the 
company reserves to right to deviate from the desired mining 
arrangement and setup selected by the investor. 
Cloud mining companies should consider this analysis when 
determining in which U.S. states they will be offering their services, 
and whether to register their investment contracts as securities with the 
SEC or offer such investment contracts pursuant to private placement 
exemptions from registration. A private fund structure may be worth 
exploring.  
The implications of whether a cloud mining arrangement is a 
security are far-reaching. Issuers and other participants involved in the 
sale of unregistered securities or that engage in fraud in violation of the 
Securities Act may be subject to liabilities and other investor remedies 
under state and federal securities laws, including private rights of 
action and rescission.196  
In the federal context, rescission offers have been made with 
consideration of the Securities Act, Section 12 right of rescission of a 
buyer in a fraudulent transaction (e.g., seller making a materially 
misleading statement in the offering materials, including on a 
webpage) and/or one involving a technical violation (e.g., seller 
offering unregistered securities outside of a private placement or other 
exemption from registration). Importantly, regardless of whether a 
rescission offer is made, rescission cannot be used to eliminate all 
liability. The federal securities laws expressly prohibit “any condition, 
stipulation, or provision binding any person . . . to waive compliance” 
with securities laws, including any rules of self-regulatory 
organizations.197 Thus, cloud mining companies cannot prospectively 
                                                             
 196. Most states have statutes that provide a detailed rescission offer process to cure 
securities laws violations (also known as “blue sky” laws), and generally, offerees who reject a 
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contract out of compliance with securities laws in their contracts with 
customers. 
The remedy of rescission is further complicated by the fact that 
cloud mining offerings generally accept only other cryptocurrencies as 
consideration—typically, Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum, Litecoin, 
and other cryptocurrencies. This wrinkle presents a unique question 
complicated by the volatility of Bitcoin: must the issuer return the 
number of Bitcoins received at the time of purchase or the 
dollar/Bitcoin exchange rate at the time of purchase? Ultimately, this 
may be an issue to be decided by regulators or the courts.198 
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